Every forecast I've ever built started the same way: exporting a CSV from NetSuite and praying nothing changed since this morning. The joys of static data.

I'm sure you know the pain - ERP actuals over here, CRM pipeline over there, and a hiring plan in a Google Sheet someone on the People team owns.

By the time you've stitched it all together, the numbers are stale and you've spent your week as a data plumber instead of a finance leader.

Cool, cool, cool.

This is why I think it's worth knowing that Abacum just became a Built for NetSuite SuiteApp. This is a pretty big deal as it is the first FP&A platform live in the NetSuite App right now.

Abacum sits on top of NetSuite and gives you connected planning, forecasting, reporting, and scenario modeling against live data. Strava, PostHog, and JG Wentworth already run their planning on it.

If you recognize yourself in the first sentence of this email, it's probably worth a look.

This is my quant. My quantitative.

Shaking out the couch cushions for capital

Wazzzzuppppp

I know I said I’d do a second post on the state of net dollar retention rates following last week’s post on disclosures not being disclosed so much. But then Google announced it was raising $80 billy in equity financing to keep building data centers and stuff.

  1. That’s a big number. Actually, the largest ever public equity offering.

  2. It is rare for publicly traded companies to choose equity financing over debt

    1. One of the core benefits of being public is access to the debt markets, so you don’t have to keep selling stock and diluting shareholders.

    2. Equity financing is typically looked at as the most expensive type of funding. More on this later.

  3. It is even rarer for an incredibly profitable publicly traded company to do a follow on equity raise

So NDR part deuce will have to wait one more week.

The three drawers you open when you need cash

To take a step back, when you need money to buy something in excess of what you’ve saved, you have three options (outside of calling your parents).

You can use the cash you generate from your business - Google has quite literally the best cash machine in the world - ads. It’s like oil, but in digital form, and with little to no marginal cost to produce more units. Plus, in what crazy scenario do your customers bid up the price of your highly accretive products for you?

Over the trailing twelve months the company generated $174 billion of operating cash flow. To zoom in on last quarter, they pumped out $45.8B. But $35.7B of that went to fund Capex. That leaves just over $10B to put back on the balance sheet or return to shareholders.

The next option is debt. You can only take on so much. Over the past year the company raised more than $85 billion of debt across six currencies, pushing total debt past $100 billion from $25 billion a year ago. One of those issues was a 100 year bond, notes that come due in 2126 at 6.125%, which means Google borrowed money that gets paid back by people who have not been born yet (also, I feel old reading that, kinda like when you see an NBA player born in 2003).

Which brings us to the third drawer, equity, or selling a portion of yourself.

Management recognized that loading even more debt onto the balance sheet would risk choking their pristine AAA/AA+ credit ratings. So they made the rare choice to pivot to the $80 billion equity raise to cover the remainder of the 2026 data center expansion.

This move dilutes current shareholders, who now own a smaller chunk of the company. But you’re doing it to make the entire pie worth more by way of whatever you’re funding (in this case compute capacity (and employee tax liabilities)).

What we’re seeing is a capital markets balancing act of massive proportions, as the company tries to optimize the mix between these three levers. Every finance team plays this game, but we’ve never seen it done at this magnitude. Just like your company, Google doesn’t want to overweight debt. And they also don’t want to run out of cash. But they also don’t want to dilute their shareholders and tank the stock price.

On the Q1 call, management guided 2026 capital spending to somewhere between $180 and $190 billion, and said 2027 would only climb from there. Some quick addition and subtraction and you can see they’re about to spend more building AI infrastructure this year than the best business model in the world can generate in cash.

Why you sell stock when it has never been more expensive

Like I mentioned, it’s unusual to raise follow on equity as a public company, especially when you’re doing well (stock is near an all time high).

To be more specific, Google’s equity offering is 3x larger than anything we’ve seen before. And the majority of other offerings were companies that were in deep shit: either surviving a manufacturing and safety crisis (Boeing) or recapitalizing financial institutions to avoid insolvency during the 2008 meltdown (BofA, AIG, Citi). Alphabet is the first company to ever raise capital on this scale from a position of financial strength.

I excluded Petrobas bc that was more of a Brazilian state run thing

In essence, we’re witnessing a company weaponize its $4 trillion market cap. At that valuation, their cost of equity is remarkably cheap. Conversely, after printing over $75B in bonds in under a year, their incremental cost of debt is rising.

It’s a great lesson for private companies - when your equity is valued at an all time high, your stock is the cheapest currency on the balance sheet. Alphabet's finance team realized that continuing to fund 100% of physical infrastructure with debt would drive up their marginal cost of capital. So they chose to issue equity to re-balance their WACC (weighted average cost of capital).

What they’re also doing by linking the data center expansion to equity is better matching the time horizon of assets to liabilities. You do not fund a permanent, generation-defining industrial infrastructure shift purely out of rolling quarterly working capital or short-term bank debt. Yes, chips don’t have a useful life of forever, but they’re building massive data centers in which they can continue to refresh those chips. They’re treating AI infrastructure like a massive utility expansion with a long term horizon. And by pulling $80 billion out of the equity markets, they’re creating a permanent capital base that mirrors the multi-decade lifecycle of the physical grids they’re constructing. Plus, they’re forcing shareholders who buy in to come along for the multi decade journey with them.

How you move $80 billion without tanking your own stock

Don’t be this guy.

So it begs the question - if you choose to walk this path, how do you do so without rocking the boat?

It would be a crazy strategy to just dump $80 billion on retail investors and let the chips (share price) fall where they may. They anchored $10 billion of it with Berkshire Hathaway, a steady, long term investor. And for a good chunk of the rest they are using mandatory convertibles so they have a fixed and known dilution schedule. This keeps public float more predicable.

While you are not Alphabet (unless Alphabet’s CFO Anat Ashkenazi is reading this - if so, what up Big Dog!), and you do not have a four trillion dollar currency or a hundred billion in borrowing capacity, the principles still hold.

When your valuation is rich, your equity is cheap, and yet that is exactly the moment most CFOs and founders clutch their shares like the last chopper out of Saigon. I’ve been here before, and parting with stock at a high price feels like getting robbed... Even though it’s actually getting cheap dollars in the door.

The second lesson is that scared money don’t make money. If you’re in for a penny you’re in for a pound. The worst choice you can make is taking one approach with your product roadmap and another with your capital strategy. The market does not reward halfway measures. And winning second place generally sucks.

So open the expensive drawer while it’s full. Because it has a way of closing without much warning.

Weekly Valuation and Efficiency Metrics

Revenue Multiples

Revenue multiples are a shortcut to compare valuations across the technology landscape, where companies may not yet be profitable. The most standard timeframe for revenue multiple comparison is on a “Next Twelve Months” (NTM Revenue) basis.

NTM is a generous cut, as it gives a company “credit” for a full “rolling” future year. It also puts all companies on equal footing, regardless of their fiscal year end and quarterly seasonality.

However, not all technology sectors or monetization strategies receive the same “credit” on their forward revenue, which operators should be aware of when they create comp sets for their own companies. That is why I break them out as separate “indexes”.

Reasons may include:

  • Recurring mix of revenue

  • Stickiness of revenue

  • Average contract size

  • Cost of revenue delivery

  • Criticality of solution

  • Total Addressable Market potential

From a macro perspective, multiples trend higher in low interest environments, and vice versa.

Multiples shown are calculated by taking the Enterprise Value / NTM revenue.

Enterprise Value is calculated as: Market Capitalization + Total Debt - Cash

Market Cap fluctuates with share price day to day, while Total Debt and Cash are taken from the most recent quarterly financial statements available. That’s why we share this report each week - to keep up with changes in the stock market, and to update for quarterly earnings reports when they drop.

Historically, a 10x NTM Revenue multiple has been viewed as a “premium” valuation reserved for the best of the best companies.

Efficiency

Companies that can do more with less tend to earn higher valuations.

Three of the most common and consistently publicly available metrics to measure efficiency include:

CAC Payback Period: How many months does it take to recoup the cost of acquiring a customer?

CAC Payback Period is measured as Sales and Marketing costs divided by Revenue Additions, and adjusted by Gross Margin.

Here’s how I do it:

  • Sales and Marketing costs are measured on a TTM basis, but lagged by one quarter (so you skip a quarter, then sum the trailing four quarters of costs). This timeframe smooths for seasonality and recognizes the lead time required to generate pipeline.

  • Revenue is measured as the year-on-year change in the most recent quarter’s sales (so for Q2 of 2024 you’d subtract out Q2 of 2023’s revenue to get the increase), and then multiplied by four to arrive at an annualized revenue increase (e.g., ARR Additions).

  • Gross margin is taken as a % from the most recent quarter (e.g., 82%) to represent the current cost to serve a customer

  • Revenue per Employee: On a per head basis, how much in sales does the company generate each year? The rule of thumb is public companies should be doing north of $450k per employee at scale. This is simple division. And I believe it cuts through all the noise - there’s nowhere to hide.

Revenue per Employee is calculated as: (TTM Revenue / Total Current Employees)

  • Rule of 40: How does a company balance topline growth with bottom line efficiency? It’s the sum of the company’s revenue growth rate and EBITDA Margin. Netting the two should get you above 40 to pass the test.

Rule of 40 is calculated as: TTM Revenue Growth % + TTM Adjusted EBITDA Margin %

A few other notes on efficiency metrics:

  • Net Dollar Retention is another great measure of efficiency, but many companies have stopped quoting it as an exact number, choosing instead to disclose if it’s above or below a threshold once a year. It’s also uncommon for some types of companies, like marketplaces, to report it at all.

  • Most public companies don’t report net new ARR, and not all revenue is “recurring”, so I’m doing my best to approximate using changes in reported GAAP revenue. I admit this is a “stricter” view, as it is measuring change in net revenue.

OPEX

Decreasing your OPEX relative to revenue demonstrates Operating Leverage, and leaves more dollars to drop to the bottom line, as companies strive to achieve +25% profitability at scale.

The most common buckets companies put their operating costs into are:

  • Cost of Goods Sold: Customer Support employees, infrastructure to host your business in the cloud, API tolls, and banking fees if you are a FinTech.

  • Sales & Marketing: Sales and Marketing employees, advertising spend, demand gen spend, events, conferences, tools.

  • Research & Development: Product and Engineering employees, development expenses, tools.

  • General & Administrative: Finance, HR, and IT employees… and everything else. Or as I like to call myself “Strategic Backoffice Overhead.”

All of these are taken on a Gaap basis and therefore INCLUDE stock based comp, a non cash expense.

Companies Included

1. Security & Identity (17 companies)

Endpoint, network, IAM, security operations. The CISO budget.

CrowdStrike, Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet, Cloudflare, Zscaler, Okta, SentinelOne, SailPoint, CyberArk, Check Point, Qualys, Tenable, Rapid7, Varonis, Rubrik, Mitek, OneSpan

2. Data & AI Infrastructure (12 companies)

Modern data stack, AI/ML platforms, vector and analytics infra, GPU compute. Software-native by design. The legacy hardware names (HPE, NetApp, Lumen, Rackspace, Cisco) that used to live in the old “Cloud Platforms” bucket are gone.

Snowflake, Arista Networks, Equinix, CoreWeave, MongoDB, DigitalOcean, Elastic, Akamai, Fastly, Teradata, C3.ai, Cerebras

3. Dev Tools & Observability (10 companies)

Anything bought out of the engineering budget. The observability names used to live separately. Combined them with dev tools because they’re sold to the same buyer through the same procurement motion.

Datadog, Atlassian, Figma, Dynatrace, Nutanix, GitLab, UiPath, JFrog, AvePoint, PagerDuty

4. Horizontal SaaS & Back Office (18 companies)

Software sold across industries to ops, HR, finance, and collaboration teams. Not vertical-specific.

Oracle, ServiceNow, Workday, ADP, Paychex, Paycom, Paylocity, Zoom, DocuSign, Navan, monday.com, Asana, Workiva, BlackLine, RingCentral, 8x8, Box, Dropbox

5. GTM (MarTech & SalesTech) (18 companies)

Anything bought out of the revenue org. Marketing automation, sales engagement, CRM, ad tech, customer experience.

Salesforce, Adobe, HubSpot, The Trade Desk, Twilio, Klaviyo, Braze, ZoomInfo, Freshworks, Amplitude, Semrush, Five9, Zeta Global, Wix, Sprout Social, ON24, Yext, Criteo

6. Vertical SaaS (16 companies)

Software built for a specific industry without take-rate or transaction economics. This bucket used to include Toast, Olo, and Shopify. They don’t belong here. They make money on transaction volume, not seat licenses or SaaS usage. They’re in #7 now.

Palantir, Autodesk, Veeva, Aspen Technology, Samsara, ServiceTitan, Guidewire, Tyler Technologies, Doximity, Procore, AppFolio, CCC Intelligent Solutions, Blackbaud, nCino, CareCloud, CS Disco

7. Take-Rate Platforms (19 companies)

Marketplaces and commerce platforms that earn money on transaction volume. This is a new bucket. It’s the single biggest reason your old Vertical SaaS median was hard to use, especially if you’re a hospitality or commerce CFO trying to find your comp set.

Uber, Airbnb, Shopify, MercadoLibre, DoorDash, eBay, Zillow, CarGurus, Instacart, Etsy, Toast, Lyft, Opendoor, StubHub, Olo, Upwork, Udemy, Ethos, Fiverr

8. Payments & Money Movement (11 companies)

The rails. Payment processors, payment infrastructure, B2B payments, treasury. Volume game, utility margins. Used to be jumbled in with consumer fintech in a 28-company FinTech bucket. Now they’re on their own.

Intuit, Fiserv, Adyen, PayPal, Block, Shift4, BILL, Clearwater Analytics, Flywire, Marqeta, Lightspeed

9. Consumer Fintech, Lending & Crypto (16 companies)

The front-end. Consumer-facing financial apps, BNPL, lending platforms, crypto exchanges. CAC-driven, marketing-heavy, totally different unit economics from #8.

Coinbase, Robinhood, SoFi, Chime, Affirm, Upstart, Circle, Bullish, Figure, Klarna, Sezzle, Gemini, Blend, Remitly, MoneyLion, LendingClub

Please check out our data partner, Koyfin. It’s dope.

Wishing you trade at a high revenue and EBITDA multiple,

CJ

Reply

Avatar

or to participate